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The United Nations Paris Agreement creates a specific need to compare consequences of cumulative emissions for
pledged national commitments and aspirational targets of 1.5° to 2°C global warming. We find that humans have
already increased the probability of historically unprecedented hot, warm, wet, and dry extremes, including over
50 to 90%of North America, Europe, and East Asia. Emissions consistentwith national commitments are likely to cause
substantial andwidespread additional increases, includingmore than fivefold for warmest night over ~50%of Europe
and >25%of East Asia andmore than threefold forwettest days over >35%of North America, Europe, and East Asia. In
contrast, meeting aspirational targets to keep global warming below 2°C reduces the area experiencing more than
threefold increases to<10%ofmost regions studied.However, large areas—including>90%ofNorthAmerica, Europe,











Recognition of the proportional relationship between cumulative car-
bon emissions and global temperature change represents one of the
most important insights of climate science during the past decade
(1–3). This proportional relationship, which is seen in both the his-
torical record and climate model simulations (3), has catalyzed a
transition to international policy structures that are built around cu-
mulative emissions (4, 5), culminating in the United Nations (UN) Paris
Agreement (6). Given the structure of the Paris Agreement, there is a
specific need to compare the levels of cumulative emissions identified
in the nationally determined contributions (NDCs; which represent the
actual country commitments) and the more aspirational targets of “ag-
gregate emission pathways in order to hold the increase in global av-
erage temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and to
limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels” (6).
Differences in the mean climate between the UN cumulative emis-
sions targets and the UN cumulative emissions commitments could be
large enough to affect natural and human systems (7). However, for a
number of reasons, it is likely that the highest-impact differences be-
tween the UN targets and commitments will be driven by differences
in the response of extreme events. First, when observing the historical
record, it is clear that the most acute climate vulnerabilities are asso-
ciatedwith extremes (8–10). These vulnerabilities are seen across human
and natural systems, including bothwealthy and poor communities, and
both terrestrial and marine ecosystems (10). Second, assessments of the
potential impacts of future climate change identify changes in the fre-
quency and/or intensity of extremes as a primary driver of future risks
(10–13). This is particularly true for smaller increases in climate forcing,
where small changes in the mean can create high-impact changes in
extremes (14–18). Comparing potential impacts between the UN targets
and commitments therefore requires rigorous, observationally based
quantification of changes in the likelihood of extremes (19–21).
Changes in various quantiles of extremes have been thoroughly ex-
plored (3, 10, 13). However, accurately quantifying the probability thatfuture events exceed the most extreme value found in the historical
record poses unique challenges (22). For example, the magnitudes of
many recent record-setting events have been particularly extreme rel-
ative to the length of available historical observations. The limited
observational sample, combined with the nonstationarity of the his-
torical time series, creates numerous challenges for quantifying the
true underlying variability and hence the true probability of the record
event (23). Likewise, if the UN’s aspirational targets are to be achieved,
then emissions will need to be dramatically reduced over the near-term
decades (24). Those near-term decadal time scales exhibit substantial
ambiguity between the signal of climate forcing and the noise of climate
variability, particularly on the regional and local scales at which extreme
events occur (22, 25–27).
Despite these methodological challenges, the distinct risks posed by
unprecedented events create a pressing need to quantify their probabil-
ities at cumulative emissions levels consistent with the UN targets and
commitments. We therefore extend the methods of Diffenbaugh et al.
(22), who developed multiple metrics for testing the influence of global
warming on the severity and probability of historically unprecedented
events. However, whereas Diffenbaugh et al. focused exclusively on the
historical period using a single climatemodel, we extend theirmethods to
quantify the probability of record-settinghot, cold,wet, anddry extremes
at all available observational grid points, using multiple climate models,
for both historical climate forcing and future forcing windows. These
future forcingwindows are selected to be consistentwith global warming
of ~1° to 2°C and~2° to 3°C, allowing us to quantify the differing risks of
unprecedented climate extremes associated with the UN aspirational
targets versus the UN NDC commitments (28).
Although numerous studies and assessments have examined the re-
sponse of extreme events to changes in climate forcing (19, 29–31), our
analyses expand on these previous efforts in a number of ways. First, we
compare the influence of human forcing on the probability of un-
precedented extremes for multiple metrics, both during the historical
period and for future periods consistent with the UN cumulative emis-
sions budgets. This comparison enables quantification of the level of
adaptation—in terms of increased climate risk—that will be required
if different targets are achieved and of the value—in terms of avoided
climate risk—associated with different levels of emissions mitigation.
Second, previous analyses of changes in extreme events have been
largely confined to changes in simulated quantile thresholds, which1 of 9
SC I ENCE ADVANCES | R E S EARCH ART I C L Eoften do not represent the record-setting event (19, 29–31). Our
analyses provide a new quantification of uncertainty in the probability
of unprecedented events that is grounded in the observed historical sta-
tistics of multiple extreme climate metrics. Because the UN emissions
budgets span overlapping uncertainty in global temperature change
(28), this observationally based treatment of uncertainty is particularly
critical for quantifying differences in unprecedented event probabilities
between the UN targets and commitments.RESULTS
The CLIMDEX project has archived a suite of globally gridded ob-
served and simulated extreme event indices (29, 32). We analyze
eight of the CLIMDEX indices, which together provide two metricsDiffenbaugh, Singh, Mankin, Sci. Adv. 2018;4 : eaao3354 14 February 2018each for hot, cold, wet, and dry extremes [Fig. 1 and fig. S1; seeMaterials
and Methods for descriptions of the observations and Coupled Model
Intercomparison Project (CMIP5) simulations].
Across the eight extreme indices, the probability of the warmest
night exhibits the most widespread response to increasing forcing,
with almost half of the global-scale return interval ratios exceeding 5
for cumulative emissions consistent with 2° to 3°C of global warming
(Fig. 1B). [In this case, a ratio of 5 means that cumulative emissions
of ~3500 gigatons (GT) of CO2 increase the probability of exceeding
the historical maximum warmest night by a factor of 5 relative to the
world without human influence.] The hottest day, mildest cold night,
andmildest freeze length also exhibit substantial sensitivity,with approx-
imately a quarter of the global-scale return interval ratios exceeding 5
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B  Warmest night F  Wettest dayD  Mildest freeze length H  Longest dry spell
1986–2005 RCP8.5 2016–2035 RCP8.5 2036–2055
~2500 GT CO2, ~1–2˚C ~3500 GT CO2, ~2–3˚C~1500 GT CO2, ~1˚C
Historical change UN aspirational level UN commitment level
TNn PRCPTOTTXx R95p
CDDTNx ID0 Rx1day
Fig. 1. Theglobal change inprobability of exceeding thehistorically unprecedentedevent at three levels of forcing. Global-scale cumulativedistribution functions (CDFs)
are calculated from all bootstrapped return interval ratios at all observationally available grid points for each level of anthropogenic forcing (see Materials and Methods). The
horizontal axis is the change in probability calculated as the return interval ratio between the natural and anthropogenic forcing. For example, a ratio of 5 means that, in the
anthropogenic forcing, the probability of exceeding themost extreme historically observed value is five times the probability in the world without human influence. The vertical
axis is the cumulative fraction of all ratios calculated at all available grid points that are less than or equal to a given ratio. Insets show 1minus the value on the vertical axis, which
gives the fraction of ratios that are greater than a given ratio. For example, if a given CDF curve intersects 5 on the horizontal axis and 0.75 on the vertical axis, then 75% of all
calculated return interval ratios are less than or equal to 5, and the insetwill show that 25%of all calculated ratios are greater than 5. The dark gray vertical line in each panel shows
where the return interval ratio between the natural and anthropogenic forcing is equal to 1, meaning that the probability of exceeding the most extreme historically observed
value is equivalent in the natural and anthropogenic forcing. The three levels of anthropogenic forcing are the 1986–2005 period of the Historical simulations (~1500 GT CO2
emitted and ~1°C of global warming above the pre-industrial), the 2016–2035 period of the RCP8.5 simulations (~2500 GT CO2 and ~1° to 2°C), and the 2036–2055 period of
the RCP8.5 simulations (~3500 GT CO2 and ~2° to 3°C).2 of 9
SC I ENCE ADVANCES | R E S EARCH ART I C L EWet events show more widespread sensitivity than dry events, with
more than a quarter of the global-scale return interval ratios exceeding 5
for both extreme wet metrics (wettest day and wettest wet days) for
cumulative emissions consistent with 2° to 3°C (Fig. 1, E and F). In con-
trast, although both the driest year and the longest dry spell already ex-
hibit increases in probability in the current climate, they exhibit little
additional increase in global extent for cumulative emissions consistent
with either 1° to 2°C or 2° to 3°C (Fig. 1, G and H).
The historical forcing has already increased the probability of both
the hottest day and the warmest night over most of the observational
area (Fig. 2, A and D, and fig. S2). For the hottest day, the historical
forcing has increased the probability relative to natural forcings (that
is, ratios >1) for more than half of the available data points in East Asia
(56.3%), more than two-thirds in North America (70.9%), and more
than three-quarters in Europe (76.7%), Australia (82.4%), and southern
South America (85%). The historical increases are even more widespread
for the warmest night, with ≥90% of the available data points in NorthDiffenbaugh, Singh, Mankin, Sci. Adv. 2018;4 : eaao3354 14 February 2018America, Europe, Australia, and southern South America exhibiting
ratios of >1, and almost 10% in East Asia exhibiting ratios of >3.
Exceeding 2°C of global warming increases the probability of the
hottest day substantially. For example, whereas less than 10% of the
available data points in Europe exhibit hottest day ratios of >3 (relative
to Historical) for cumulative emissions consistent with 1° to 2°C of
globalwarming,more thanhalf (51.7%) exhibit ratios of >3 for cumulative
emissions consistent with 2° to 3°C. Similarly, in East Asia, the median
hot day ratio remains below 3 (relative to Historical) for all available
data points for cumulative emissions consistent with 1° to 2°C of global
warming, but more than a quarter of those data points (28.6%) exhibit
ratios of >3 for cumulative emissions consistent with 2° to 3°C.
The probability that the coldest events of the year becomemoremild
also increases substantially as cumulative emissions increase (Fig. 3).Most
of high-latitude Eurasia and North America have already experienced
increased probability that the coldest night of the year exceeds themild-
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70.9 0 0  91.7 0 0  98.2 7.6 0
76.7 0 0  100 7.5 0  100 51.7 16.7
56.3 0 0  96.6 0 0  100 28.6 0.8
85 0 0  100 0 0  100 0 0
82.4 0 0  73.5 0 0  67.6 0 0
Ratios > 1 Ratios > 3 Ratios > 5
Ratios > 1 Ratios > 3 Ratios > 5 Ratios > 1 Ratios > 3 Ratios > 5 Ratios > 1 Ratios > 3 Ratios > 5
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89.5 1.1 0  99.6 1.4 0  100 69.6 10.9
90.6 0 0  100 37.6 0.9  100 98.3 48.7
73 9.6 0  99.1 7 1.7  100 92.2 25.2
100 0 0  100 2.7 0  100 21.6 2.7
92.9 0 0  100 0 0  100 14.3 0
Fig. 2. The change in probability of exceeding the historically unprecedented hot event at three levels of forcing. Maps show the median value of the bootstrapped
return interval ratios between the lower and higher forcing. (Full distributions for all grid points are shown in Fig. 1). For ratios reported as “relative toNatural,” the lower forcing
is that for aworld without human influence; for ratios reported as “relative toHistorical,” the lower forcing is the combined human and natural forcing that occurred during the
historical period (seeMaterials andMethods). (A to C) Median return interval ratio for the hottest maximumdaily temperature of the year (maximum TXx value; “hottest day”).
(D to F) Median return interval ratio for the warmest minimum daily temperature of the year (maximum TNx value; “warmest night”). As described in Materials and Methods,
the analysis is limited to the areas with observed values in the CLIMDEX data set (missing areas shown inwhite; fig. S1). See fig. S2 for regional boundaries used in the regional
summary calculations.3 of 9










 at higher levels of forcing, with return interval ratios of >2 (relative to
Historical) for cumulative emissions consistent with 1° to 2°C of
global warming (Fig. 3B), and ratios of >3 for cumulative emissions
consistent with 2° to 3°C (Fig. 3C). Areas of high-latitude Eurasia
and North America also exhibit particularly strong increases in the
probability of the mildest freeze length, including return interval ratios
of >4 (relative to Historical) over large areas of Eurasia for cumulative
emissions consistent with 2° to 3°C (Fig. 3F).
As with temperature extremes, large fractions of the observed area
already exhibit increased probability of record-level wet events, includ-
ing ≥70% of the available data points in North America, Europe, East
Asia, southern South America, and Australia for both extreme wet
metrics (Fig. 4, A and D). The fraction of available points that exhibit in-
creases in probability of record-level wet events expands for cumulative
emissions consistent with 1° to 2°C of global warming (Fig. 4, B and E).
However, the intensification of wet event probability is substantially
greater for cumulative emissions consistent with 2° to 3°C, with 15 to
60% of the available data points in North America, Europe, East Asia,
and southern South America exhibiting ratios of >3 (relative to His-
torical) for both metrics (Fig. 4, C and F). We note that the increases
in probability are generally more substantial and widespread for theDiffenbaugh, Singh, Mankin, Sci. Adv. 2018;4 : eaao3354 14 February 2018fraction of total precipitation falling in wet days (“wettest wet days”)
than for the magnitude of the wettest single day of the year (“wettest
day”). This difference suggests that the risk of increasing extreme wet
events is greater than what is indicated by the wettest single event and
can occur across a broader range of the precipitation distribution—and
therefore potentially result in more sustained wet conditions.
Compared with hot, cold, and wet events, increases in extreme dry
probabilities are less widespread (Figs. 1 and 5). This discrepancy is
caused primarily by the fact that substantial areas experience decreasing
probability of both the driest year and the longest dry spell (Fig. 5).
These areas of decreasing dry probabilities are concentrated in the high
latitudes, where precipitation increases are most robust (33). However,
the fact that continued increases in cumulative emissions do not cause
substantial increases in extreme dry probabilities at the global scale
(Fig. 1) does not mean that the probability of dry events is not respon-
sive to increasing forcing. Large fractions of the northern and southern
hemisphere mid-latitudes exhibit increasing probability of eclipsing
the historically driest year and longest dry spell (Fig. 5). These include
many areas that are currently heavily populated and highly vulnerable,
such as the Mediterranean, southern Africa, Southeast Asia, and
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91.2 0 0  97.9 0 0  99.3 14.4 1.1
75.6 0 0  81.7 0 0  87.8 20.6 0
65.1 0 0  96.8 0.8 0  100 9.5 0.8
58.3 0 0  83.3 2.1 0  81.3 14.6 0
93 0 0  96.5 0 0  96.5 1.8 0
73.3 1.4 0.7  89.9 3.6 1.4  89.5 46.2 4.7
47 5.2 5.2  63.9 13.9 2.8  75 34.4 19.8
44.8 1 1  76.5 4.9 3.9  76.2 40.6 6.9
44.8 10.3 0  52 16 8  44 4 0
– – –  – – –  – – –
Ratios > 1 Ratios > 3 Ratios > 5
Ratios > 1 Ratios > 3 Ratios > 5 Ratios > 1 Ratios > 3 Ratios > 5 Ratios > 1 Ratios > 3 Ratios > 5
Ratios > 1 Ratios > 3 Ratios > 5 Ratios > 1 Ratios > 3 Ratios > 5
Fig. 3. The change in probability of exceeding the historically unprecedented mild cold event at three levels of forcing. As in Fig. 2, but for coldest minimum daily
temperature of the year (maximum TNn value; “mildest cold night”) and number of days with maximum temperature below 0°C (minimum ID0 value; “mildest freeze length”).4 of 9










 already emerged over most of these regions, but also continued emis-
sions substantially intensify the regional increases. Regional intensi-
fication is particularly strong for the longest dry spell, with areas of
North America, Europe, southern South America, and southern Africa
exhibiting higher probability of record-setting events for cumulative
emissions consistent with 2° to 3°C of global warming than 1° to 2°C
of global warming (Fig. 5, E and F). The fact that increases in probability
are generally more substantial and widespread for the longest dry spell
of the year (“longest dry spell”) than for the minimum annual precip-
itation (“driest year”) suggests that the risk of increasing extreme dry
conditions is greater at subannual than annual time scales and that
the probability of prolonged dry conditions within the year can increase
even if the probability of the driest year does not.DISCUSSION
We note a number of important considerations when evaluating our
results. One is that although the CMIP5 ensemble accurately simu-
lates the observed variability of most of the extreme indices over most
areas, there are areas of disagreement (fig. S1). Although our method-
ology does use the observed uncertainty in the probability of the record-
setting event to implicitly correct errors in the climate model probabilityDiffenbaugh, Singh, Mankin, Sci. Adv. 2018;4 : eaao3354 14 February 2018(seeMaterials andMethods), the regions where the climate model en-
semble does not accurately simulate the observed variability (fig. S1)
should be treated with caution.
In addition, because our methodology is built around the ob-
served statistics of each extreme climate indicator, analyses are
limited to areas with observational coverage in the CLIMDEX data
set (22). Areas that lack observational coverage could exhibit substantial
changes in the probability of record-setting events, particularly in the
tropics, where the mean warming has been large relative to the his-
torical variability (21, 34, 35). Not only would inclusion of these areas
alter the global-scale CDFs shown in Fig. 1, but also many of these
areas coincide with large human populations, high human vulnera-
bility, and/or high biodiversity, whose exposure to changing extreme
event probabilities is not represented in our results due to the lack of
observational coverage.
We can provide some estimation of the change in probability in
these regions by calculating how often the maximum/minimum value
of the CMIP5 natural forcing (“HistoricalNat”) simulations is exceeded
in the CMIP5 historical and future scenarios (figs. S3 to S6). These
occurrence frequencies suggest that areas lacking observational cov-
erage are also likely to exhibit substantial increases in the probability
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Historical baseline RCP8.5 2016–2035 RCP8.5 2036–2055
~1500 GT CO2, ~1˚C ~2500 GT CO2, ~1–2˚C ~3500 GT CO2, ~2–3˚C
79.6 0.7 0  96.6 4.8 0  97.3 36.1 8.8
89 0 0  96 13 2  96 59 15
70 0 0  100 6.7 0  100 37.8 12.2
80.8 0 0  80.8 0 0  80.8 15.4 0
90.9 0 0  77.3 0 0  72.7 0 0
73.6 0.8 0  95 3.3 0  97.5 14.9 1.7
83.2 0 0  93.7 5.3 1.1  100 18.9 6.3
81.9 1.4 0  94.4 8.3 1.4  100 30.6 9.7
73.3 6.7 0  80 0 0  93.3 20 0
86.7 6.7 0  93.3 0 0  100 0 0
Ratios > 1 Ratios > 3 Ratios > 5
Ratios > 1 Ratios > 3 Ratios > 5 Ratios > 1 Ratios > 3 Ratios > 5 Ratios > 1 Ratios > 3 Ratios > 5
Ratios > 1 Ratios > 3 Ratios > 5 Ratios > 1 Ratios > 3 Ratios > 5
Fig. 4. The change in probability of exceeding the historically unprecedentedwet event at three levels of forcing. As in Fig. 2, but for annual precipitation fromdays that
exceed the 95th percentile (maximum R95p value; “wettest wet days”) and wettest day of the year (maximum Rx1day value; “wettest day”).5 of 9










 cumulative emissions consistent with 2° to 3°C of global warming, the
occurrence of the hottest day and wettest day is more than five times the
recent historical occurrence over most of tropical South America and
tropical Africa (figs. S3 and S5). Likewise, for cumulative emissions
consistent with both 2° to 3°C and 1° to 2°C, the occurrence of the driest
year and longest dry spell is more than three times the recent historical
occurrence over substantial fractions of tropical South America and
tropical Africa (fig. S6).
We also note that our analysis of cumulative emissions windows
within transient climatemodel simulations is likely to yield conservative
estimates of the ultimate climate response, because further regional
climate change is likely to occur after emissions are terminated (36).
The occurrence frequencies of the maximum/minimum HistoricalNat
value in the CMIP5 Representative Concentration Pathway (RCP) sim-
ulations (figs. S3 to S6) provide a test of the sensitivity to the pathway of
cumulative emissions. For example, the cumulative emissions are similar
inRCP8.5 andRCP2.6 in the first three decades of the 21st century, after
which they diverge sharply, with themid-21st century cumulative emis-
sions of RCP8.5 exceeding the late-21st century cumulative emissions of
RCP2.6 (3). The rapid decline in annual emissions in RCP2.6means that
the global temperature remains approximately between 1° and 2.5°C
above the pre-industrial for the second half of the 21st century ofDiffenbaugh, Singh, Mankin, Sci. Adv. 2018;4 : eaao3354 14 February 2018RCP2.6 (3, 33). Therefore, comparison of the mid-century of RCP2.6
with the late century of RCP2.6 provides an approximation of the
sensitivity of the event probability to changes in regional climate that
occur after near stabilization of the global temperature.We find that the
changes in occurrence between themid- and late-century of RCP2.6 are
broadly similar (figs. S3 to S6). However, a comprehensive quantifica-
tion of the sensitivity of event probabilities to cumulative emissions
pathway will require multiple simulations of multiple stabilization tra-
jectories using multiple climate models.
The conservativeness of our statistical methodology is another
reason that our results provide a lower bound on the probability of
unprecedented climate events at different levels of forcing identified
by global policy-makers. In particular, our methodology selects a
parametric distribution that minimizes the return interval ratio (22).
Comparing our results with the simple occurrence frequencies in the
CMIP5 simulations (figs. S3 to S6) provides a comparison of our prob-
ability quantification with the kind of ensemble frequency quantifica-
tion that has been used in previous studies and assessments (19, 29–31).
This comparison shows that our results do exhibit smaller changes than
those calculated based on thresholds from themodels themselves.How-
ever, it should be reiterated that our method allows calculation of the
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Historical baseline RCP8.5 2016–2035 RCP8.5 2036–2055
~1500 GT CO2, ~1˚C ~2500 GT CO2, ~1–2˚C ~3500 GT CO2, ~2–3˚C
32.4 0 0  28.5 0 0  30.8 0 0
50.4 0 0  44.3 0 0  55.7 0 0
65.9 0 0  48.8 0 0  41.5 0 0
55.6 0 0  64.4 0 0  88.9 0 0
23.5 0 0  79.4 0 0  85.3 0 0
53.4 0 0  45.1 0 0  47.6 2.9 0
55.7 0 0  79.2 0 0  84.9 11.3 0
47.9 0.9 0  45.3 0.9 0  41.9 0.9 0
64.6 0 0  95.8 0 0  95.8 12.5 2.1
76.7 0 0  100 11.6 0  100 7 0
Ratios > 1 Ratios > 3 Ratios > 5
Ratios > 1 Ratios > 3 Ratios > 5 Ratios > 1 Ratios > 3 Ratios > 5 Ratios > 1 Ratios > 3 Ratios > 5
Ratios > 1 Ratios > 3 Ratios > 5 Ratios > 1 Ratios > 3 Ratios > 5
Fig. 5. The change in probability of exceeding the historically unprecedented dry event at three levels of forcing. As in Fig. 2, but for total annual precipitation (minimum
PRCPTOT value; “driest year”) and longest consecutive dry spell of the year (maximum CDD value; “longest dry spell”).6 of 9





 event based on the statistics of the observed distribution (22), which is
distinct from approaches that have analyzed the frequency of occur-
rence of the simulated quantiles (19, 29–31).
Our analyses also provide an important comparison with the
historical attribution analyses of Diffenbaugh et al. (22). First, we
extend the number of extreme event metrics from four in the study
of Diffenbaugh et al. to eight in the current analysis. Second, whereas
Diffenbaugh et al. did not differentiate human and natural forcings
during the historical period, our analysis isolates the human com-
ponent of the historical climate forcing. Third, whereas Diffenbaugh et al.
used many realizations of a single climate model [the National Center
for Atmospheric Research (NCAR) “Large Ensemble”], our analysis
spans a larger range of uncertainty by analyzing results from multiple
climate models.
A high priority of the proof-of-concept study of Diffenbaugh et al.
(22) was to isolate the “irreducible uncertainty” arising from internal
climate system variability. In contrast, our emphasis on quantitatively
comparing historical and future changes makes spanning both internal
variability andmodel structural uncertainty a key requirement. As shown
by Diffenbaugh et al., the historical global warming in the NCAR Large
Ensemble falls in the lower half of the CMIP5 multimodel ensemble.
Therefore, by using many climate models, our current analysis spans
a far greater range of climate sensitivity, which is crucial for comparing
climate risks associated with the UN targets versus the UN NDC com-
mitments. Likewise, given the potential for systematic errors in the
simulation of the atmosphere and ocean circulation to create errors
in the simulated response of temperature and precipitation to changes
in forcing (37, 38), the use of multiple climate models also enables our






Our results provide the first quantitative comparison of the probability
of unprecedented climate events in cumulative emissions windows that
are consistent with both historical changes and the UN aspirational tar-
gets andpledgednational commitments.Analysis of cumulative emissions
consistent with global warming of 2° to 3°C shows that the commitments
outlined in the UN Paris Agreement are likely to lead to substantial and
widespread increases in the probability of historically unprecedented
extreme events. For example, 15 to 60% of observed locations in North
America, Europe, East Asia, and southern SouthAmerica exhibit return
interval ratios of >3 for most of the extreme indices analyzed here. In
contrast, analysis of cumulative emissions consistentwith globalwarming
of 1° to 2°C shows that achieving the more aspirational UN targets is
likely to substantially limit those increases.
However, even if cumulative emissions are sufficiently constrained
to ensure that global warming is held to 1° to 2°C, many areas are still
likely to experience substantial increases in the probability of un-
precedented events. At the global scale, hot, cold, wet, and dry extremes
all exhibit prominent changes in event probability within the 2°C target,
including more than fivefold increases at ~25% of the observed area for
warmest night and wettest wet days andmore than twofold increases at
~25% of the observed area for hottest day. These changes encompass
substantial fractions of the United States, Europe, East Asia, and the
southern hemisphere mid-latitudes. For example, >90% of observed lo-
cations in those regions exhibit increases in the probability of record-
hot days and/or record-warm nights relative to the current climate,
and 45 to 100% exhibit increases in probability of the longest dry spell.
Further, although much of the tropics lack long-term observationalDiffenbaugh, Singh, Mankin, Sci. Adv. 2018;4 : eaao3354 14 February 2018coverage, analyses of climate simulations indicate increases in record
hot, wet, and dry events that are at least as substantial as the increases
seen over the mid-latitude regions.
Together, our results suggest that the aspirational UN emissions tar-
gets are likely to yield substantial reductions in climate risk relative to
the changes arising from pledged national commitments but also that
those aspirational targets are likely toproduce substantial—andpotentially
high-impact—increases in the probability of unprecedented extremes
relative to the current climate.MATERIALS AND METHODS
Observations and models
The CLIMDEX project has archived globally gridded extreme event in-
dices for both historical observations and climate model simulations
of historical and future forcing trajectories (29, 32).We analyzed eight of
the CLIMDEX indices: (i) hottest maximum daily temperature of the
year (TXx), (ii) warmest minimum daily temperature of the year (TNx),
(iii) coldestminimumdaily temperature of the year (TNn), (iv) number
of days with maximum temperature below 0°C (ID0), (v) annual pre-
cipitation from days that exceed the 95th percentile (R95p), (vi) wettest
day of the year (Rx1day), (vii) total annual precipitation (PRCPTOT),
and (viii) longest consecutive dry spell of the year (CDD).
We applied the methods of Diffenbaugh et al. (22) to calculate the
probability of exceeding the most extreme observed value of each of
these eight indices. For these indices, “exceeding the most extreme ob-
served value”means hotter than themaximumTXxvalue (“hottest day”),
warmer than themaximumTNx value (“warmest night”), warmer than
the maximum TNn value (“mildest cold night”), fewer days than the
minimum ID0 value (“mildest freeze length”), wetter than themaximum
R95p value (“wettest wet days”), wetter than themaximumRx1day value
(“wettest day”), drier than theminimumPRCPTOTvalue (“driest year”),
and longer than the maximum CDD value (“longest dry spell”).
CLIMDEX calculated the simulated extreme event indices using
output fromCMIP5 (39). CLIMDEX has archived indices for the CMIP5
Historical, HistoricalNat, and RCP simulations. We analyzed the cli-
matemodels for which there arematching realizations in theHistorical,
HistoricalNat, andRCP8.5 simulations. Following the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), we used the “r1i1p1” realization from
each model (40), yielding a total of 15 realizations from 15 models.
Analysis
We followed the analysis of Diffenbaugh et al. (22), who compared four
attributionmetrics during the historical period. To extend the historical
analysis of Diffenbaugh et al. to periods of elevated climate forcing, we
focused on their fourth metric, which is the ratio of return intervals at
lower and higher levels of climate forcing. (For example, an event that
has a probability of 0.01—or a return interval of 100 years—in the lower
forcing and a probability of 0.05—or a return interval of 20 years—in
the higher forcing has a return interval ratio of 5). To account for un-
certainty in the return interval of the observed record-level event, a
distribution of return interval ratios was calculated at each grid point.
To do so, we block bootstrapped the grid point time series at the lower
and higher forcing levels to generate two distributions of return intervals;
we then calculated ratios between all combinations of bootstrapped
return intervals at lower and higher forcing, yielding a distribution of
return interval ratios (22).
Some modifications are necessary to apply the methods of
Diffenbaugh et al. (22) to the multimodel CMIP5 ensemble under7 of 9










 both historical and elevated levels of forcing. First, because CLIMDEX
archived the extreme indices for the CMIP5 HistoricalNat simulations
rather than the CMIP5 Pre-Industrial Control simulations, we used
the HistoricalNat experiment as the “counterfactual” world without
human influence. (The Pre-Industrial Control and HistoricalNat
simulations are similar, but whereas the Pre-Industrial Control sim-
ulations use constant pre-industrial forcing, the HistoricalNat simu-
lations add the volcanic and solar forcing that occurred during the
historical period; the HistoricalNat simulations therefore enable iso-
lation of the anthropogenic forcing during the historical period). We
used the 1961–2005 period to calculate the return interval of the most
extreme event in both the observations and the HistoricalNat simula-
tions [see the study of Diffenbaugh et al. (22)].
We compared the return interval of the most extreme observed
value between the HistoricalNat forcing and three anthropogenic
forcing windows: the 1986–2005 period of the Historical simulations,
the 2016–2035 period of the RCP8.5 simulations, and the 2036–2055
period of theRCP8.5 simulations. The 1986–2005period of theHistorical
simulations is the baseline period used by the IPCC (3, 13), at the end of
which there were ~1500 GT CO2 emitted and ~1°C of global warming
above the pre-industrial (3); comparing the return interval of the most
extreme observed value between the HistoricalNat simulations and the
1986–2005 period of theHistorical simulations quantifies the influence
of historical anthropogenic forcing on the probability of the most ex-
treme historical event. The 2016–2035 period of RCP8.5 encompasses
a scenario in which there are ~2500 GTCO2 emitted and ~1° to 2°C of
global warming above the pre-industrial (3); comparing the return in-
terval of the most extreme observed value between the 1986–2005 pe-
riod of the Historical simulations and the 2016–2035 period of RCP8.5
thereby quantifies the change in event probability for a future in which
the emissions and global warming targets outlined in the Paris Agree-
ment are met. In contrast, the 2036–2055 period of RCP8.5 encom-
passes a scenario in which there are ~3500 GT CO2 emitted and ~2°
to 3°C of global warming above the pre-industrial (3); comparing the
return interval of the most extreme observed value between the
1986–2005 period of the Historical simulations and the 2036–2055 pe-
riod of RCP8.5 thereby quantifies the change in event probability for a
future in which the UN NDC emissions commitments—but not the
UN emissions targets—are met (3, 24, 28, 41).
We note that Millar et al. (42) have provided a more recent update
of the cumulative emissions-temperature relationship shown in the
IPCCFifthAssessment Report (AR5). Because they are based on the same
underlying CMIP5 simulations that were used to generate the findings
in the IPCC AR5, the cumulative emissions windows are similar be-
tween the periods presented here and those by Millar et al. For ex-
ample, the cumulative emissions thatMillar et al. identify as having a
66% chance of staying below 1.5°C above the pre-industrial fall close
to 2030 of RCP8.5, and the cumulative emissions that Millar et al.
identify as having a 66% chance of staying below 0.6°C above the re-
cent decade occur near 2040 of RCP8.5. Further, the cumulative emis-
sions that Millar et al. identify as having a 66% chance of exceeding
1.1°C above the recent decade fall close to 2050 of RCP8.5.
In addition, whereas the proof-of-concept study of Diffenbaugh et al.
(22) analyzedmany realizations of a single climatemodel, the CLIMDEX
archive contains output from many climate models but at most a few
realizations of each model. Given the importance of sufficient popula-
tion size for quantifying the probability of rare events (23), we pooled
the CMIP5 realizations, yielding a total of 300 simulated years in each
20-year forcing period.We found that the pooled climate model outputDiffenbaugh, Singh, Mankin, Sci. Adv. 2018;4 : eaao3354 14 February 2018generally agrees with the CLIMDEX observational data (that is, the
P value using the Anderson-Darling test comparing distributions is
>0.10, indicating that the null hypothesis that the simulated and
observed values are drawn from the same underlying distribution
cannot be rejected at the 1, 5, or 10% significance levels; fig. S1).
Note that the method of Diffenbaugh et al. (22) includes a bias
correction step. As described by Diffenbaugh et al., to evaluate each
model’s simulation of interannual variability in each climate index,
this bias correction is based on the differences between the detrended
observations and the climate simulation without human forcings.
First, the climate model mean is corrected to be equal to the observa-
tional mean (that is, by subtracting the difference between the climate
model mean and the observational mean from the climate model time
series). In the current analysis, we corrected each CMIP5 realization
individually and then pooled the corrected data into a single “bias-
corrected” CMIP5 population. This approach allows us to leverage
the variability across the full CMIP5 ensemble while simultaneously
controlling for the mean biases of the individual climate models.
In addition, the method of Diffenbaugh et al. also controls for errors
in the climate model variability by defining the simulated sample of
event return intervals to be identical to the observed sample of event
return intervals. That sample of event return intervals is then used to
define the sample of event magnitudes in the pool of climate model
simulations. This approach of defining the sample of simulated event
magnitudes based on the sample of observed event return intervals
helps to control for the effect of variability biases on event magnitudes
in the tail of the simulated distribution.SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS
Supplementary material for this article is available at http://advances.sciencemag.org/cgi/
content/full/4/2/eaao3354/DC1
fig. S1. Statistical comparison of observed and simulated climate indices during the historical
period.
fig. S2. Regions used in regional summary calculations.
fig. S3. Frequency of occurrence of the maximum “HistoricalNat” hot event value in the CMIP5
RCP8.5 and RCP2.6 simulations.
fig. S4. As in fig. S3, but for mild cold events.
fig. S5. As in fig. S3, but for wet events.
fig. S6. As in fig. S3, but for dry events.REFERENCES AND NOTES
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